Research on police integrity has focused to a large extent on the assessment of the seriousness of various forms of police misconduct. Employing vignettes cases it has been shown that police officers identify clear differences among forms of misconduct and these differences largely hold across countries and contexts. Moreover, the impact of a range of individual and organizational characteristics on the assessment of misbehavior has been established. This chapter analyzes the impact of perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness among Ugandan police officers to assess the external validity of the assessments of the seriousness of misconduct presented in the vignettes. The research focuses on ten aspects of police officers' perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness and shows that the perceptions are strongly interrelated and that they impact on attitudes towards police integrity. Thus, while the vignettes are meant as a tool to reduce subjective biases in the evaluation of police misbehavior, the assessment of the vignettes is not free of individual perceptions. This suggests that the vignettes can be seen as means to channel and represent the individual subjective biases in a coherent and comparable form.
Introduction
As a key element of the 'strong arm' of the state, the police have generally been the subject of much academic research. The police face the so-called 'paradox of violence' of the democratic state: the police (next to the army) claim the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, but also need to respect legal restraints on the actual use of its powers. As argued by Gary Marx (2001) , 'a democratic society needs protection both by police and from police'.
Given the role of police in society, the integrity of police officers is very important.
Moreover, identification of the factors that promote police integrity and those that hinder it has considerable societal relevance.
Research on police integrity has grown substantially over the past two decades (see the overview of publications in Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 18-30) . The academic literature in this field received a major boost with the seminal work of Klockars et al. (2000) , who developed a method for the measurement of police integrity built on hypothetical cases (vignettes) rather than attempts to ask police officers direct questions about their behavior. The advantage of the approach is that it reduces bias since the vignettes do not directly inquire about own behavior but ask for the assessment of the hypothetical behavior depicted in the cases. Moreover, the vignettes allow the presentation of a set of uniform cases to all study participants independent of their experience and (socio-economic) background. This method was underpinned by the so-called organizational theory of police integrity, consisting of four dimensions: organizational rules, techniques of controlling police misconduct, the police agencies' efforts of curtailing the 'code of silence' in the police force, and the influence of the social and political environment on the police force (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 5-11) .
Previous studies have mainly focused on the internal validation of the vignette approach to police integrity. First, studies have demonstrated that more severe cases are judged more severely (e.g., Jenks et al., 2014: 330) . Second, the vignettes have shown to be applicable across countries and contexts, subject to minor context-specific adjustments, thus yielding coherent results (Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015: 334) In order to add to the existing body of work evolving to a large extent around the internal consistency of the vignette approach, this chapter aims to assess the external validity of the vignettes. Thus, we link evaluative questions about the vignettes to the perceived institutional environment and perceptions of police effectiveness and assess to what extent they are related. We consider the police officers' own perceptions of the situation and the work of the police as prime candidates for such an analysis.
This chapter uses questions about the perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness among Ugandan police officers to contextualize the findings on police integrity measured by the vignettes. We have identified ten elements of the perceived institutional environment (e.g., similar treatment by age, gender, and socio-economic status; level of crime in the community) and police effectiveness (e.g., confidence in own and colleagues' work) and analyze the relationship of these elements with the evaluative responses to the vignette cases. Our data, collected in 2015 in an attempt to evaluate a police reform project (see, e.g., Hout et al., 2016: 51-75) , expressly contained questions about the wider environment of the Ugandan police force, as well as police officers' own assessments of their work situation and perceptions of the operations and effectiveness of the police organization. Thus, our research attempts to contribute to research in the tradition of the organizational approach to police integrity by focusing mainly on how police officers' perceptions of their institutional environment may impact on their position on various forms of police misconduct.
Next to adding to insights about the external validity of the vignettes, we make a methodological contribution to the literature on police integrity. While it is relevant to assess the hypothetical cases one by one and compare the assessments of police officers, we feel it is equally valuable to pool the outcomes and look at patterns underlying the ensemble of vignettes to contribute to a deeper understanding of the usefulness of vignettes.
Police integrity and perceptions of the police force
Research in the field of governance has led to the definition of integrity as 'the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules' (Lasthuizen et al., 2011: 387) , where integrity can be a quality both of individuals and organizations. Police integrity is commonly understood as 'the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation' (Klockars et al., 2006: 1) .
The literature on police integrity has hitherto focused mostly on the impact of various (socio-economic and experience-related) characteristics of police officers and the infrastructure and overall situation of the police agencies on the perceptions of seriousness of police misconduct and the perceptions of fellow officers' willingness to report (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 18-27) . Research focusing on perceptions of the institutional environment in the police force has remained surprisingly scarce, although it is not difficult to argue that the way in which police officers perceive their environment may have an impact toward their attitudes on misconduct and their willingness to report acts of misconduct.
Several studies have demonstrated how differences at the macro-societal level impact on police officers' attitudes to corruption, the treatment of prisoners, and other forms of misconduct. For instance, Kutnjak report on research among the police in Croatia and show that features of society at large seem to play a role in officers' assessment of police misbehavior, although the impact of such community characteristics is limited by variations in organizational features of the police. Further, a study on police integrity in Russia finds a clear impact of the overall societal perception of corruption. The authors of that study (Cheloukine et al., 2015: 179) conclude as follows:
In the environment in which corruption is entrenched into everyday life and everything is for sale, the acceptance of kickbacks … and thefts from the crime scene … are the new 'normal.' In the situation in which planting of evidence on innocent people and falsification of official records to bust the arrest records are occurring on a regular basis, falsification of a police record … and a failure to exercise an arrest warrant on a friend … are also becoming the new 'normal.'
Comparative studies on police integrity corroborate the impact of the institutional environment and, in particular, of the social perception of corruption (e.g., Andreescu et al., 2012: 198-199; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015) . Further, comparative research on the treatment of suspect behavior and the use of force indicates how the culture of a police force seems to impact on the attitudes of police officers toward the use of force (Waddington et al., 2009: 134-135) . Finally, a team of French researchers demonstrated how the 'professional ideologies' of police officers (expressed in the three main positions that police activity should be mainly repressive or preventive or a combination of both) are impacting on their opinions on the role of the police (Coulangeon et al., 2012) .
Relatively little research has so far been done on the perceptions of police officers regarding the police force and on how these perceptions affect police officers' attitudes toward misconduct and their willingness to report misconduct. Various studies have addressed the impact of the organizational culture and the code of silence on the perceptions of police officers about police integrity (e.g. Kucukuysal, 2008; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2015) , while others have analyzed the impact of different disciplinary environments on perceived disciplinary consequences of misconduct (e.g., Lee et al., 2013; Kutnjak Ivković and Khechumyan, 2014; Cheloukine et al., 2015; Kuo, 2018) .
Further, a number of studies have focused on the impact of perceptions of disciplinary fairness (i.e., how fair do officers feel that the disciplinary consequences of their behavior are?) on the likelihood that misconduct will be reported and the code of silence will be broken (e.g. Kutnjak Ivković and O'Connor Shelley, 2010; Long et al., 2013; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2013; Porter et al., 2015) . Wolfe and Piquero (2011) showed how different aspects of perceived organizational justice -broken down into distributive, procedural and interactional aspects -influence the incidence of police misconduct. Using a slightly different approach, Myhill and Bradford (2013) demonstrated how perceptions of organizational justice impact positively on police attitudes to serving the public. Finally, a study by Bucak (2012) has shown that police cynicism (understood as the pessimistic outlook of police officers towards their job) has an impact, albeit moderately, on police integrity.
The lack of attention to perceptions of police officers on the functioning of the police force, and particularly its effectiveness, has motivated the current study. We feel that a more profound analysis of police officers' perceptions of the effectiveness of their own work and its possible relationship with police integrity would contribute to a better understanding of the influence of the social and political environment on the police force (the fourth dimension highlighted in the organizational theory of police integrity). In a similar vein as Bucak (2012: 44-49) we start from the hypothesis that the way in which police officers appreciate their work, and in particular the degree to which they believe that their work contributes to social values, impacts on the way they perform their duties. Thus, the perception of one's own work as being ineffective may lead to the acceptance of corruption and other forms of misconduct on the part of the police.
The Uganda National Police
Before moving on to our empirical analysis we present some background information about Uganda and its police force. Since 1986, Ugandan politics has been dominated by President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM), the political successor to the National Resistance Army (NRA), which prevailed in the Ugandan Bush War, the protracted civil war against the regime of Milton Obote (1980 Obote ( -1985 . The Ugandan 'Movement System', which existed from 1986 until 2005, was envisaged to be a non-party political system, where representatives were elected on individual rather than party platforms. Museveni won the first Ugandan presidential elections in 1996 and was re-elected to the presidency in four subsequent national elections (2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016) . Although Uganda has had multiparty elections since the mid-2000s, Museveni's regime has become increasingly authoritarian. Regime maintenance became an important objective, and this led to the search for instruments to broaden the regime's support base among the Ugandan population (Khisa, 2014) .
Increased opposition led the Museveni regime to mobilize political support for the NRM by using patronage-driven appointments and tolerating corruption, the rising costs of which have been labeled 'inflationary patronage' (Khisa, 2014: 32-36; Barkan, 2011; cf. Tangri and Mwenda, 2013) . Decentralization has been an important instrument of patronage; the increase of the number of districts from around 40 in the mid-1990s to 111 since 2012 (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives, 2017) served as a means for the regime to appoint its supporters to local government positions (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2013: 16-17) . Further, the NRM government became increasingly repressive, targeting independent media, the judiciary and opposition parties (Anderson and Fisher, 2016) . In recent decades, the Uganda National Police and the national army have been important instruments of the regime's attempts to maintain power. A former army commander, Major-General Mugisha Muntu, and current opponent of the Museveni regime, characterized the Uganda National Police recently as 'an extension of the ruling party' (Economist, 2018).
The Ugandan police force was institutionalized in 1906 (Uganda Police Force, 2007) and has officially been known as 'Uganda National Police' since April 2014 (Lumu, 2014) . It is divided functionally into 20 directorates based on tasks and geographically into regional and district offices, police stations and posts (Uganda Police, 2015) . Data about the police and policing activities is scant since the statistical capacity of the police is weak (Uganda Police Force, 2007) . In the early 2000s, Uganda had fewer than 15,000 police officers, with considerable year-to-year variation according to the available statistics (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006a: 26-27) . In 2007, the Ugandan police force experienced a major increase of personnel -it went from approximately 27,000 to 48,000 officers -and saw the creation of more directorates in preparation for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Xinhua News Agency, 2007) . At the end of 2014, the Inspector General announced an increase of the police from roughly 40,000 to 65,000 officers (Kakamwa, 2014) .
Concerning crime statistics and the security environment in Uganda, 252,065 crimes were reported in 2017, resulting in a crime rate involving 667 victims per 100,000 Ugandans Uganda is in the top quintile of the most corrupt countries according to the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2018) and the Ugandan police is regarded as particularly corrupt (Wambua, 2015; Basheka, 2013: 72-74; Transparency International-Kenya, 2013) . Results of various surveys -including Uganda's National Service Delivery Study 2015 (Kato, 2016) The characteristics of corruption and fraud in Uganda, and the perception of corruption within the Ugandan national police, make the country an interesting case to study police integrity in relation to the extent to which police officers themselves perceive their work as effective. We expect that, in particular, the high-corruption context of Uganda may reveal challenges to integrity and professionalism among the police.
Survey set up, sampling, and questionnaire
Our data are derived from interviews with police officers from 10 of the 143 Ugandan police districts (Uganda Police, 2017: e, f). The survey districts are Bushenyi, Iganga, Jinja, Kabale, Kabarole, Tororo, Luwero, Mbarara, Mityana, and Soroti. On purpose, no single Northern Ugandan district was sampled because of the impact of the conflict between the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army rebels on the region. We employed the vignette cases along with questions about the perception of police work among 600 police officers in the 10 selected districts, sampling 60 officers within each district. The data collection was carried out by our local university partner, the Uganda Management Institute. The research team worked in close collaboration with the police. After authorization from the police headquarters, the local research team wrote a letter to the regional police officers informing them about the activities and asking for support. The research team then identified the study participants together with the police. The district-level sampling strategy was well respected with only some very minor deviations: in two districts only 59 officers could be interviewed, while in another two districts 61 officers were interviewed. Thus, the target sample of a total of 600 individuals was reached since officers that could not participate were replaced.
We organized the survey in groups of 30 officers. Survey activities took place at the local level. To this end we rented venues that where equipped with enough tables and chairs for 30 police officers. To reach the target number of 60 officers per district, at least two survey sessions took place in every district, one in the morning and one in the afternoon of the scheduled survey days.
In an introduction, the enumerators presented the survey to the participating police officers and allowed for questions. The survey was conducted in English since English is one of the two official languages in Uganda and widely spoken in public services and government.
The survey consisted of a self-administered pen and paper questionnaire. Each police officer was provided enough personal space to ensure privacy and confidentiality. To further protect anonymity, we did not ask the officers to provide their names or addresses. All survey activities took place in April 2015.
In terms of sampling, we aimed at the representation of officers across all levels of rank. To this end, individual officers were selected in a stratified way. First, we purposively invited regional-level officers to participate in the survey because of their leading position. Second, we also purposively included the leading police officers of the district headquarters in the survey. Finally, we randomly sampled police stations within districts: Half the officers in our sample come from small stations (with up to 10 officers) and 70% of them from mid-sized stations (with up to 25 officers). We introduced random participation at the police station level by randomly picking the day of the survey resulting in local participation based on availability or presence. At the local level we do not expect any systematic selection of participants into our sample since the police stations only have few officers. As motivated, we applied this sampling procedure to have a stratified sample of officers that represents the full spectrum of police work, functions, positions, and hierarchies.
The survey among police officers had two parts. In the first part, officers reported their basic socio-economic characteristics together with information about their work experience and some basic facts about the staffing and equipment of their police station. In the second and core part, officers were asked to review twelve vignette cases and questions about the perceived institutional environment and effectiveness of the police. The vignettes were adapted to the Ugandan context based on the earlier versions developed by Klockars et al. (2000 Klockars et al. ( , 2006 and Kutnjak Ivković (2005a Ivković ( , 2005b . Adaptation to the local context was necessary since, for example, the offering of small gifts on holidays such as Christmas is not perceived as an indication of corruption. Furthermore, we wanted to test to what extent the police complaint form, introduced by the Ugandan police prior to our survey, was accepted among the police. Therefore, we included a case about the application of the form. Similarly, the peaceful monitoring of demonstrations and the professional clearing of potential conflicts, while accepting the right to demonstrate, was another aspect of policing that we considered necessary assessing in the specific Ugandan context. The complaint form as well as the monitoring of demonstrations were topics that were perceived as very relevant by the locals.
Thus, the cases that we deployed were co-developed with our local research partner, pretested with the police and adjusted to the local context. Importantly, on purpose we opted for the inclusion of case scenarios with cultural load. For example, the originally proposed case scenarios contain the case of a burglary in a jewelry shop (Klockars et al., 2000 (Klockars et al., , 2006 . Since jewelry shops are not common in local Uganda there would not have been any value in presenting such a scenario. Consequently, we introduced a burglary in a general merchandise shop. We specified the goods relative to locally know units and products in an attempt to contextualize and to ensure that the police officers responding to the case had a good sense of the stolen value. Similarly, we included the category "Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon" since this was identified by civil society organizations as a major problem in Uganda. Thus, we were taking a needs-based and context-specific approach when replacing existing and integrating new cases. We consider this the strength of our analysis since the vignettes are the result of an in-depth analysis of the local context and conditions prior to the implementation of the case scenarios at scale.
We presented the vignette cases in random order to avoid an order by severity. For the sake of exposition in this chapter, we have grouped the cases into six categories of two cases each: the first group focuses on the code of conduct among police officers, the second on bribery, the third on theft, the fourth on the refusal to register a complaint against the police, the fifth on severe crimes against individuals that are not followed up by the police, and the sixth on undue force used by the police against suspects and demonstrators (table 1) .
The wording of the vignette cases can be found in Appendix 2. Note that we implemented the vignettes in the context of an impact assessment of the Police Accountability and Reform Project (for detailed results see Hout et al., 2016; Wagner et al., 2019; Hout et al. 2019 ).
Moreover, the original wording of the vignette cases allowed for the random variation of the gender of the portrayed police officers, perpetrators, and victims. The related gender dynamics are assessed in a separate article (Wagner et al., 2017) . We show there that neither the randomly varying gender of the police officer nor the randomly varying gender of the victim depicted in the vignette cases are related to the judgment of police malpractice, or to suggested disciplinary measures. What we do find is that male respondents tend to be stricter in their assessment of the hypothetical cases. Overall, the results show that gender perceptions do not differ between male and female police officers. Based on this finding, we do not expect that the survey experiment has any repercussions for the analysis at hand. Most importantly, since the gender variations were introduced randomly and balancing holds well across randomly introduced male and female gender attributes, we are methodologically on the safe side.
In our survey we obtained comprehensive answers to five of the original seven These questions were chosen because our survey was implemented in the context of Dutch policies and funding decisions focusing on rule of law and control of corruption initiatives in Uganda. The multi-facetted aspects of good governance to reduce corruption were the guiding principles for Dutch financial involvement. The above ten questions were selected to capture good governance at the level of the police. On purpose we focused on aspects of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness. Our approach is in line with Miles-Johnson and Pickering (2018) who assess police recruits' perceptions of trust in minority group members. Our first four questions are motivated by the idea that police officers evaluate their work relative to the broader community they live and work in and the different groups that constitute that community. In addition, question 1 is motivated by the finding that police officers have positive perceptions of their work when crime is reduced .
Questions 5 and 6 are motivated by the fact that by and large the existing literature assesses confidence and relatedly trust in the police (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013; Bradford, 2014; Mastrofski et al., 2016) but the aspect of own confidence receives less attention. We argue that police officers can only view their role as positive if next to the perception of the police by the public, the officers themselves have confidence in their work and the work of their colleagues. In addition, existing evidence shows that police officers perceive a sense of effectiveness when they are perceived as upholding the law (Jenks et al., 2012) . This rational motives question 7. Questions 8 and 9 are meant to capture procedural fairness and justice, as well as policing that is equitable across all members of society (Miles-Johnson, 2016 ).
Finally, question 10 asks for a self-assessment of the level of corruption at the police. Our approach is related to the work by Carr and Maxwell (2018) who assess officers' perceptions of organizational justice on officer trust in the public. Similar to our research they employ multiple perception questions. Yet, their focus is different since they consider the relationship with the supervisor, as well as distributive and procedural justice within the police force.
Individually and jointly our set of 10 questions allows us to assess perceptions of the institutional environment and effectiveness of the police. Thus, in our analysis we combine the information we have obtained from the vignette cases with the questions about perceived institutional environment and effectiveness to see how these perceptions affect police officers' attitudes toward misconduct and their willingness to report such behavior.
Descriptive statistics

Background characteristics of the police officers and the districts
Descriptive statistics of the background characteristics of the respondents and related to district characteristics are presented in table 2, Panel A.
<Table 2 about here>
The data on individual characteristics of the respondents provide an overview of the police officers included in our research. The average officer in the sample is almost 42 years old.
Slightly less than a quarter of the respondents are female. Most of the officers are married (84%) and a similar percentage of the interviewees are head of a household (84%). They live in a household with, on average, almost 7 people. However, variation in household size is substantial (the standard deviation is 4). Almost half of the officers have completed secondary education, while 27% finished advanced secondary education and 25% have a higher education degree. Less than 3% have completed only primary education. Thus, our sample consists of prime-age individuals, who are predominately male and have a fairly high level of education relative to the overall population of Uganda. We control for all these aspects in the multivariate analysis to ensure that our findings are not influenced by variations in omitted background characteristics.
In terms of economic well-being, we observed the following. Around 60% of the respondents earn between UGX 300,000 and 500,000 on a monthly basis.
1 Another almost 25% of the sample earn UGX 500,000 and more. The average respondent owns 1.34 mobile phones and has almost 2 habitable rooms at home. The inclusion of these economic variables in the analysis ensures that our results of interest are not influenced by differences in income that might be related to differences in perceptions.
Sports activities are reported by 53% of the respondents and almost half of the respondents indicate being a member in a club or community organization. The latter two aspects serve as controls for the activity levels of the respondents and their readiness to actively engage in activities next to their work. We consider it necessary to control for these aspects since perceptions are linked to behavior not only at work but also in private life.
Work-related characteristics are presented in Panel B of table 2. They form part of the second set of control variables. We collected information on the section of the police force the respondents are placed in, the length of their career as a police officer, and the infrastructure at their station (number of rooms, number of cars/motorcycles/bicycles). The average police officer has spent 18.8 years in service. Unsurprisingly, there is a considerable variation in this variable (the standard deviation is 10.5). The majority of the respondents, that is 46%, perform general duties. Officers working in the investigation section make up 26% of the sample. The remaining officers work for other sections, including traffic police and intelligence departments. The police stations they are placed in vary greatly in size: on average they have 12.8 rooms but the standard deviation is 9.3. Police motorcycles are the most common means of transport for the officers. The average station has 6.8 motorcycles,
while it also possesses 1.5 cars and 2.1 bicycles.
Finally, Panel C of table 2 presents some district-level characteristics. We selected the 600 respondents from 10 districts, while aiming to obtain pairs of two similar districts in the district selection. To assess the district socio-economic and crime related situation we collected district level administrative data for all 10 districts from the local administrations:
The average district has roughly 420,000 inhabitants and grows at an annual rate of 2%, while about one-fifth of the population is living in poverty. The average Gini inequality index is 0.4 (District level administrative data). The districts are ethnically fairly homogeneous, as is
shown by the finding that more than 70% of the population at district level belong to the district's main ethnic group. The number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants is 133.
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The crime rate is 338.2 and the homicide rate is 8.6 (District level administrative data). Similar to the individual-level characteristics we control for the district-level characteristics in the multivariate analysis to avoid that our results are biased as a consequence of differences across districts.
Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables derived from the vignette cases
The descriptive statistics of the five outcome variables that we collected for the twelve vignette cases are presented in We observe that the responses to all five questions range on average between 3.9 and 4.4, which suggests that the depicted cases of misbehavior are taken seriously by the officers.
We find the lowest average Likert rating (3.9) for the evaluative question about the disciplinary measure that should follow and the highest average rating (4.4) for the evaluative question whether the behavior is a violation of official policy. Moreover, we observe that the officers think that they themselves consider the depicted cases of misconduct slightly more seriously compared to their colleagues (table 3) .
Concerning the detailed descriptive statistics per case, our findings are in line with observations of other researchers in the field (cf. Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015: 340-346 ). We find that there is a sorting of assessments by case severity (see table A1 in Appendix 1). The first two vignette cases, on police code of conduct, are judged rather mildly.
Receiving holidays in exchange for repairing a supervisor's car is assessed moderately negatively (the average score is 3.72), although officers tend to be generally aware that such behavior violates official policy (average score of 4.24), which they would report (average score of 4.06). The misbehavior described in the second case, related to covering a drunk colleague who caused an accident, is by and large seen as a light offense.
Cases of bribery are depicted in the second group of vignettes. Case 3, on accepting gifts while on duty, receives the lowest Likert scores of all cases. All respondents score only slightly higher than the neutral position (a value of 3) when it comes to reporting a colleague.
Case 4, related to the acceptance of bribes, is evaluated very critically, as indicated by the score of 4.4. Moreover, police officers tend to agree that this misbehavior should be subject to stringent disciplinary action (average score of 4.3).
The third group of cases contains incidences of theft. Case 5 (the misappropriation of money from a lost wallet) and case 6 (illegal enrichment when investigating a burglary) are judged quite harshly with scores of 4.0 and 4.5, respectively, and a great majority of respondents indicate they would report such misbehavior of a colleague. Case 6 is the instance of misbehavior that would require the toughest disciplinary response in the view of the police officers: the average score on the disciplinary action scale is 5.1.
Overall, the first six cases suggest that police officers have a clear idea about acceptable and non-acceptable police behavior: acceptance of bribes and theft are evaluated more critically than violations of the police force's code of conduct. In most cases, officers see themselves as more critical of misbehavior than their colleagues. Responses to the question whether particular forms of misbehavior violate official policy indicate the existence of a gap between formal rules and actual practices since on average they tend to receive the highest score within a case.
The next two cases depict situations in which police officers refuse to register complaints. The refusal to register a complaint and the humiliation of the complainant (case 7) is judged rather mildly (score of 3.6), but the arrest of a complainant on false grounds (case 8) is considered unacceptable by the majority of officers (score of 4.0). This is in line with our expectations and shows the internal coherence of the vignette cases.
Lastly, cases of reported severe crimes against individuals without adequate follow-up by the police (cases 9 and 10), and of the use of undue force (cases 11 and 12) are assessed seriously or very seriously. Case 9, which involves the refusal to register the mistreatment of a wife, is considered to be one of the most serious forms of police misbehavior (score of 4.3).
Police officers agree that such misbehavior should be subject to strict disciplinary action (score of 4.0). Although the failure to follow up on a reported murder (case 10) is assessed as a serious form of misconduct (score of 3.9), police officers do not feel such behavior should be punished very severely (score of 2.7 on the disciplinary action scale). The two cases of undue police force are considered to be serious, as they are rated with a score of 3.9 (case 11) and 4.1 (case 12). In these instances, disciplinary action should be quite harsh, according to the average police officer, whose response leads to a score of 3.9 on the disciplinary action scale in both cases.
Descriptive statistics of the perceived effectiveness of the police
As initially motivated we want to study the vignette case assessments in relation to the perceived effectiveness of the police. To do so, we build on the ten Likert scale questions about the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness that were introduced above in section 4. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics related to the ten perception variables on the institutional environment and police effectiveness. All variables are measured on a five-point Likert scale, similar to the measurement of the responses to the vignette cases.
<Table 4 about here>
The first item among the perception variables inquiries about the level of crime in the local community and in Uganda as a whole. The average score of 2.5 on this item indicates that police officers perceive some problems with regard to the overall crime level in the country, while, at the same time, they consider the problems to be moderately important. The next aspect we consider refers to the question whether the police treat young people the same as old people. The average rating of 4.0 suggests that the majority of the police officers thinks that younger people are treated better. In contrast, they do not on average feel that there is a big discrepancy in the treatment of poor and rich individuals (average score 3.5). Police officers tend to perceive the treatment of men as slightly more favorable compared to the way women are treated (score of 3.8).
Confidence in the police officers' own work is high as shown by the average score of 4.6 on the fourth perception component. Police officers' confidence in the work of their fellow officers is also high, albeit 0.2 points lower than confidence in their own performance, suggesting that there is some sense of an esprit de corps. When it comes to the role of the police, the officers are very clear that it is always their duty to make people obey the law. This component obtains the highest overall score at 4.7. Moreover, the great majority of interviewed police officers think the police are doing a good job in treating people fairly and with respect (average score of 4.1).
Next we turn to the management of crime: the average score of 4.30 is even 0.2 points higher than the average on the fairness and respect question, which suggests that the officers have a high opinion about the quality of policing. Here one may see some tension with the observation by the Ugandan population that the police are the most corrupt institution in the country, which was reported above in section 3. Item 9 of our perception variables addresses perceived corruption in the police force. In the light of the self-congratulatory attitude of police officers, it is not surprising that officers tend to downplay the seriousness of corruption.
The statement 'The police are corrupt' receives an average score of 2.6, which suggests that, despite their positive assessment of the work of the police, officers seem to be moderately aware that of problems with corruption in the police force. On the basis of the results reported in table 5, we include the indicators using two approaches. Firstly, we built an index that expresses the average score across all ten items.
Secondly, we retrieved the first principal component of the variables and use this component score as indicator. The bottom two rows of table 4 present the descriptive statistics using the two approaches. The average index of the ten perception variables is 3.9 with a standard deviation of 0.5. This indicates that the overall perception of police effectiveness borders on 'good' and is thus rather favorable. The average PCA index is 0.0 with a standard deviation of 1.8. The PCA index shows high variability since it is designed to accumulate maximum variability over the ten perception components. It ranges from a minimum of -6.8 to a maximum of 2.7. The next section contains a more detailed discussion of the findings of the multivariate analysis involving the responses to the questions on the perception of police effectiveness and the evaluative questions relating to the vignette cases.
Empirical model
We Second, we use a method that is considered superior and is based on the construction of an index using principal component analysis. In principal component analysis we employ an orthogonal transformation to convert our ten correlated effectiveness variables by means of a statistical procedure into linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components.
This transformation is based on maximizing the variance in the first principal component, so that this first component reflects the internal structure of the police effectiveness variables in a way that best explains their variance and contains most of the information across the original components. We employ both the average index and the principal component index separately to gauge the robustness of the results. The index creation is supported by earlier research, which attempted to derive a scale of (seriousness of) police misconduct and indicated that the vignettes appear to represent a one-or two-dimensional space (cf. Jenks, 2014: 328; Lee, 2013: 390) . Based on the existing literature, we opted for the inclusion of only one dimension since the average index is one-dimensional and we aimed for a straightforward and direct comparison of the results.
As an additional assessment of the robustness of our results, we estimate the three models that were outlined above with district fixed effects instead of including the district characteristics. Results of the latter three analyses are presented in Appendix 1 in tables A2
(for model 1, using detailed perception components) and A3 (for model 2, using the average perception index, and model 3, applying the index derived from principal component analysis).
Results
The results of our analyses are presented in tables 6 and 7. Next to the ten perception variables (table 6) or the perception indices (table 7) , all regression analyses contain the above-mentioned individual, work-related, and district-specific control variables as well as the vignette fixed effects. These coefficient estimates are not presented for the sake of brevity and clarity of exposition.
We start by assessing the relationship between the evaluative responses to the vignette cases and the individual perception components. The results that are summarized in table 6 show not only that the different evaluative responses capture different aspects of police integrity, but also that the perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness contain a variety of elements. This implies that across the five evaluative responses we find correlations with different aspects of police effectiveness. Looking into the analysis of the evaluative responses to the vignette cases one-by-one (Table 7) , we find that for the assessment of the severity of the case a one standard deviation increase in the average index (sd=0.459, see table 4, row 11) explains 6% (=[0.203*0.459]/1.546*100) of the standard deviation in the assessed severity of the case. We do not find a significant relationship between the PCA index and the severity of the case.
When it comes to the reporting of a fellow police officer, we find a stronger relationship infer that the subjective perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness undoubtedly feed into attitudes of police integrity suggesting that the vignettes can serve as a tool to channel and represent the individual subjective biases in a coherent form.
As indicated above, an additional robustness test is presented in tables A2 and A3 in Appendix 1. In the analyses underlying these tables, the district control variables are replaced with district fixed effects. The results are almost identical to the findings presented earlier in this section, not only in terms of the direction of the effect and its statistical significance, but also in terms of magnitude. These additional tests make us confident about the reliability of our results.
Conclusion
In While all of these factors relate to several dimensions of police integrity, our results also demonstrate that there is not a one-to-one relationship between the assessed dimensions of the perceived environmental context and police effectiveness, on the one hand, and the evaluations of misbehavior by police officers, on the other. When combining the ten dimensions of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness in two indices (an average index and a principal-component index) and analyzing the relationship with the evaluative responses to the vignette cases, we find further evidence that the subjective perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness feed into attitudes toward police integrity. At the same time, we find that the relationship between the evaluative questions about police integrity and the index of perceived police effectiveness is sensitive to the construction of the index. Thus, while the vignettes are meant as a tool to reduce subjective biases in the evaluation of police misbehavior, the assessment of the vignettes is not free of individual perceptions. This suggests that the vignettes can be seen as means to channel and represent the individual subjective biases in a coherent and comparable form.
We consider the results presented in this chapter only as a first attempt at linking police integrity to perceptions about the institutional environment and policing effectiveness.
In particular, our research is aiming at complementing earlier studies on the impact of various factors on the attitudes of police officers to corruption and misconduct, such as the police's organizational culture and characteristics (Eitle et al., 2014; Kucukuysal, 2008; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2015) , their disciplinary environments (Lee et al., 2013; Kutnjak Ivković and Khechumyan, 2014; Cheloukine et al., 2015; Kuo, 2018) , disciplinary fairness and organizational justice (Kutnjak Ivković and O'Connor Shelley, 2010; Wolfe and Piquero, 2011; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2013; Long et al., 2013; Myhill and Bradford, 2013; Porter et al., 2015) , individual and work related characteristics (Reynolds and Helfers, 2018; Lee et al., 2013; ) as well as police cynicism (Bucak, 2012) .
Our results suggest new avenues for research into the relationship between the evaluative positions of police officers and perceptions of institutional environment and
effectiveness. An obvious first step would be to theorize police effectiveness more Note: All variables are Likert scaled on a scale from 1 to 5 with 1 representing the category "Definitely not", "Not very good" and "Much worse" and 5 representing the category "Definitely yes", "Very good" and "Much better". Note: OLS regression results. The regressions are based on 600 individuals and their responses to 12 cases resulting in 7,200 observations. All regressions include case specific effects (not shown). Individual level socio-economic characteristics that are controlled for but coefficients are not shown: age, gender, marital status, whether the respondent is household head, education level (dummies for secondary, advanced secondary and higher education, excluded category: primary education), household size, income level (dummies), number of habitable rooms in the house, number of mobile phones owned, whether the person does sports and whether the person is a member of a community organization. Work related characteristics that are controlled for but coefficients are not shown: Years of service, rank (high rank and medium rank, low rank forms the excluded category), number of rooms of the police station, number of police cars, number of police motorcycles, number of police bicycles, Police section (traffic, investigation, intelligence, general duties, excluded category: Other sections and duties). District-level characteristics that are controlled for but coefficients are not shown: Population size (log), population growth, rate of police officers, crime rate, homicide rate, poverty head count, Gini coefficient, share of the population belonging to the main ethnicity of the district. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual respondent. Note: The regressions are based on 600 individuals and their responses to 12 cases resulting in 7,200 observations. All regressions include case specific and district specific effects (not shown). Individual level socio-economic characteristics that are controlled for but coefficients are not shown: age, gender, marital status, whether the respondent is household head, education level (dummies for secondary, advanced secondary and higher education, excluded category: primary education), household size, income level (dummies), number of habitable rooms in the house, number of mobile phones owned, whether the person does sports and whether the person is a member of a community organization. Work related characteristics that are controlled for but coefficients are not shown: Years of service, rank (high rank and medium rank, low rank forms the excluded category), number of rooms of the police station, number of police cars, number of police motorcycles, number of police bicycles, Police section (traffic, investigation, intelligence, general duties, excluded category: Other sections and duties). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual respondent. 
